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Abstract. This paper examines a disagreement over epistemic “first 
principles” that takes place in the correspondence between Spinoza and 
Blyenbergh. Blyenbergh, following Descartes, states he will doubt that which 
is clearly and distinctly understood if it conflicts with Scripture. Spinoza, in 
turn, acquiesces completely to whatever his understanding shows him. 
Because they have a disagreement over the authority of reason, Spinoza 
“hardly believes that [their] correspondence can be for [their] mutual 
instruction.” But their correspondence can serve for our instruction: In his 
dispute with Blyenbergh, Spinoza gives his clearest account of his 
commitment to reason. Like Descartes, Spinoza claims that because he 
experiences absolute certainty when he forms a clear and distinct idea, he 
completely acquiesces to the testimony of his understanding. Unlike 
Descartes however, Spinoza is unambiguous that this act of acquiescence is 
not to be understood as a voluntary act worthy of praise or criticism—but 
rather as an act of a spiritual automaton. I argue that by examining Spinoza’s 
dispute with Blyenbergh, we gain important insight into the naturalistic 
epistemic approach that undergirds Spinoza’s Ethics.  
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Introduction 
In his lifetime, Spinoza published only one philosophical work authored 
under his own name: Renati des Cartes Principiorum Philosophiae (Descartes Principles of 
Philosophy [PP]). This short work garnered Spinoza significant attention.  The work 
was, for example, noticed by the “Most Serene Highness the Elector Palatine” Karl 
Ludwig, who, apparently impressed by Spinoza’s ability to succinctly explain 
Descartes’ thought, had his councilor offer Spinoza a professorial post, a post which 
Spinoza politely declined.1  
The short work was also noticed by Willem van Blyenbergh, a Dutch 
merchant and author of the anti-Spinozistic tract, The Truth of the Christian Religion and 
the Authority of Holy Scripture Affirmed Against the Arguments of the Impious, or a Refutation of 
the Blasphemous Book Entitled Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. Blyenbergh saw in Spinoza’s 
Descartes Principles what many contemporary readers also see: Throughout the work 
Spinoza uses the geometric method to explicate part of the Cartesian philosophy, yet 
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occasionally Spinoza also hints at his own radical—and to Blyenbergh’s eyes—
blasphemous thinking.2 Indeed, Spinoza had his close friend Lodewijk Meyer; the 
editor of Descartes’ Principles, explicitly write in the introduction to the work that 
Spinoza held views that differed from the ones expressed therein: 
 
… [L]et no one think that he [Spinoza] is teaching here either his own 
opinions, or only those which he approves of. Though he judges that some of 
the doctrines are true and admits that he has added some of his own, 
nevertheless there are many that he rejects as false, and concerning which he 
holds a quite a different opinion.3  
 
In December 1664 Blyenbergh wrote to Spinoza with a general request for “a 
fuller publication” of Spinoza’s philosophical departures from the philosophy of 
Descartes.4 Given the tenor of Blyenbergh’s later anti-Spinozistic screed, it is likely he 
made this request with an eye for uncovering further evidence of Spinoza’s suspected 
blasphemies.5 
The resultant correspondence between Spinoza and Blyenbergh quickly 
breaks down over a disagreement of “first principles.” 6  But despite this 
disagreement—and Spinoza’s repeated attempts to discontinue the correspondence—
these letters are well known for the invaluable insight they offer into Spinoza’s 
thinking on the nature of good, evil, normativity, and freedom of will.  Here however 
I shall focus only upon the disagreement that derails the correspondence. For, as I 
shall argue, this disagreement is itself an important and neglected source of insight 
into the foundations of Spinoza’s epistemology. 
 
Spinoza’s First Principle 
Spinoza tries to break off his correspondence with Blyenbergh because they 
disagree over a “first principle.” Blyenbergh writes that one of his principles is to 
doubt what is clearly and distinctly understood if it conflicts with Scripture. Spinoza in 
turn, replies that it is his own first principle to acquiesce completely to what his 
understanding shows him. For Spinoza, the authority of the understanding is absolute. 
For Blyenbergh it is not. Because of this disagreement, Spinoza “hardly believes that 
that [their] correspondence can be for [their] mutual instruction.”7  
In the Ethics, Spinoza never presents complete acquiescence to the understanding as a 
“first principle.” 8  The Ethics simply starts with axioms and definitions that are 
expected to be clearly and distinctly understood as true. 9  With these axioms and 
definitions, the Ethics proceeds with demonstrations of propositions that, through the 
apparatus of the Geometric Method, are also expected to be clearly and distinctly 
understood as true. Thus in reading the Ethics, it is tempting to question Spinoza’s 
almost religious faith that whatever the understanding reveals as true, ought to be 
accepted as such—especially given the radical, and sometimes bizarre propositions 
that Spinoza presents the understanding as leading us towards.  
Indeed, historically, it was Spinoza’s confidence in the natural understanding 
that was perhaps the most criticized feature of his philosophical system. Whereas 
contemporary philosophers generally look at the Ethics doubtful that Spinoza actually 
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succeeded in constructing a system that contains only that which is clearly and 
distinctly understood, several (but certainly not all) of Spinoza’s critics ceded to 
Spinoza the eminent rationality of the work. For these critics the failure of Spinoza’s 
philosophy was not a failure in following a clear path of reasoning. Rather, they 
charged that Spinoza’s philosophy failed on account of the impious or unwarranted 
assumption that the unchecked understanding was the proper guide for 
philosophizing. For example, Freidrich Heinrich Jacobi, claimed that “the only way to 
avoid the Spinozistic conclusion” was to “abandon reason in favour of a fideistic 
commitment to a personal deity.” 10  Kant declared that, “Spinozism is the true 
conclusion of dogmatic metaphysics.”11 In contrast to Spinoza’s absolute “faith” in 
the understanding, these critics advised a careful wariness towards our mental 
faculties.  
It is worth noting however, that Spinoza himself does not identify reason or 
the understanding with a specific faculty. Instead he identifies “reason” as “nought 
else but our mind, in so far as it clearly and distinctly understands.”12 Unlike many of 
the other Early Modern philosophical greats, Spinoza does not begin his masterpiece 
with any explicit presuppositions about the power of reason or its scope.13 Spinoza 
instead identifies “reason” by way of a first-person criterion. For Spinoza, the term 
“reason” is generally simply used as sort of placeholder for whatever is clear and 
distinctly perceived.14 
To challenge Spinoza’s absolute confidence in reason then is not so much to 
challenge his confidence in a particular faculty of the mind. Rather it is to question his 
absolute confidence in that which he clearly and distinctly understands. And this cuts 
to the core of Spinoza’s geometric method—it is a challenge to Spinoza’s confidence 
that his definitions, axioms, and inferences can produce a true philosophy. As Michael 
Della Rocca puts it, “Unless his [Spinoza’s] trust in reason can be justified, Spinoza’s 
entire rationalist project, his way of prosecuting the search for explanations, indeed 
the purity of his philosophy itself is threatened.”15 Obviously then, Spinoza’s dispute 
with Blyenbergh over his trust in reason has important implications in how we are to 
understand the foundations of Spinoza’s thought. 
 
The Three Steps in Spinoza’s Attempt to Terminate the Correspondence 
It is likely that Blyenbergh began his correspondence with Spinoza looking to 
uncover Spinoza’s suspected blasphemies. Spinoza however was quite careful with 
whom he shared his philosophy. 16  In order to draw out the guarded Spinoza, 
Blyenbergh began their correspondence by taking the guise of a fellow free thinker: 
 
Blyenbergh (Ep. 18.): “But not to keep you too long wondering who it is 
and how it happens that a stranger should assume the great liberty of writing 
to you, I will tell you that it is one who, impelled only by desire for pure truth, 
strives in this brief and transitory life to set his feet on the path to knowledge, 
so far as our human intelligence permits; one who in his search for truth has 
no other aim than truth itself; one who seeks to acquire for himself through 
science neither honours nor riches but truth alone, and the peace of mind that 
results from truth… 
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Spinoza responds warmly:17  
 
Spinoza (Ep. 19.): For my part, of all things that are not under my control, 
what I most value is to enter into a bond of friendship with sincere lovers of 
truth. For I believe that such a loving relationship affords us a serenity 
surpassing any other boon in the whole wide world. The love that such men 
bear to one another, grounded as it is in the love that each has for knowledge 
of truth, is as unshakable as is the acceptance of truth once it has been 
perceived.  
 
Spinoza proceeds to answer Blyenbergh’s specific questions about the nature 
of evil and sin, and invites Blyenbergh not to hesitate to write again if he has any 
further questions.  
Blyenbergh shows no hesitation. In his next letter, Blyenbergh tells Spinoza 
that he “would have to agree with a great deal” of Spinoza’s explanations if it were 
Blyenbergh’s principle to trust his intellect over the revealed word of God.18 But as 
Blyenbergh explains to Spinoza, he has two first principles:  
 
Blyenbergh (Ep. 20.): …[Y]ou should first know that there are two general 
rules which always govern my endeavours to philosophize. One is the clear 
and distinct conception of my intellect, the other is the revealed Word, or 
will, of God. In accordance with the one, I try to be a lover of truth, while in 
accordance with both I try to be a Christian philosopher. And whenever it 
happens that after long consideration my natural knowledge seems either to 
be at variance with this Word or not very easily reconcilable with it, this Word 
has so much authority with me that I prefer to cast doubt on the conceptions 
that I imagine to be clear rather than to set these above and in opposition to 
the truth which I believe I find prescribed to me that book… 
 
Blyenbergh goes on to conclude this letter with a description of his own 
philosophical aim. The aim he now presents stands in stark contrast to the selfless 
quest for truth he claimed in his first letter. Now Blyenbergh indicates that is not 
“knowledge, so far as our human intelligence permits” that he seeks, but instead, his 
highest wish is simply to be certain—by any means—that his intellect is immortal: 
 
…[T]he only thing I ask of God, and shall continue to ask, with prayers, sighs 
and earnest supplication (would that I could do more to this end!) that as long 
as there is breath in my body, it may please him of his goodness to make me 
so fortunate that, when this body is dissolved, I may still remain an 
intellectual being able to contemplate that most perfect Deity. And if only I 
obtain that, it matters not to me what men here believe, and what convictions 
they urge on one another, and whether or not there is something founded on 
our natural intellect and can be grasped by it. This, and this alone, is my wish, 
my desire, and my constant prayer, that God should establish this certainty in 
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my soul… (and if I have it not, how wretched am I)… If only I attain to that, 
then have I all the aspiration and desire of my soul. 
 
At this point in the correspondence, Spinoza realizes that he has been misled. 
Blyenbergh is not “one who in his search for truth has no other aim than truth 
itself.”19  Instead, Blyenbergh is one who seeks certainty that his intellect will live 
beyond his body. To attain this certainty Blyenbergh does not strive for clear and 
distinct thought, rather, he offers “prayers, sighs, and earnest supplications.” Indeed, 
Blyenbergh notes that if he were to be granted certainty of his own immortality, he 
would not care what his natural intellect might show him. 
Once Spinoza grasps the manner of man he is dealing with, he tries to break 
off the correspondence. This proceeds in three steps. First, Spinoza tries to break off 
the correspondence with Blyenbergh by politely noting that their disagreement over 
first principles prevents them from having a useful correspondence: 
 
Spinoza (Ep. 21.): When I read your first letter, I had the impression that our 
views were nearly in agreement. From your second letter, however … I 
realize that this is far from being so, and I see that we disagree not only in the 
conclusions to be drawn from a chain of reasoning from first principles, but 
in those very first principles, so that I hardly believe that our correspondence 
can be for our mutual instruction. For I see that no proof, however firmly 
established according to the rules of logic, has any validity with you unless it 
agrees with the explanation which you, or other theologians of your 
acquaintance, assign to Holy Scripture.  
 
Spinoza makes it clear that it is not just a disagreement over any first principle 
that prevents them from having a useful dialogue. The key obstacle is their specific 
disagreement over the supremacy reason. Spinoza sees that Blyenbergh will reject a 
valid proof if its conclusion disagrees with his preferred interpretation of Scripture. 
And because Blyenbergh holds that the authority of Scripture can trump the authority 
of a logical proof, Spinoza sees no point in exchanging arguments that concern any of 
the theological questions that Blyenbergh has pressed.  
Spinoza does not go into further detail, but his reasoning here is plain. 
Blyenbergh had indicated to him that: 
 
If I were to pass judgment on your letter solely under the guidance of my first 
rule [i.e. following what is shown through the understanding], excluding the 
second rule [i.e. following the teaching of Scripture] as if I did not have it or 
as if it did not exists, I should have to agree with a great deal of it…and 
admire your subtle conceptions; but my second rule causes me to differ more 
widely from you.20  
 
Blyenbergh admits to Spinoza that the explanations he had provided were, 
according to the understanding, convincing. Yet, Blyenbergh still continues to reject 
Spinoza’s teachings. And Spinoza notes that if Blyenbergh can reject proofs even 
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while acknowledging them as valid, then further arguments and explanations will be 
without effect. Spinoza, quite rightfully, sees no point in continuing their dialogue.  
Second, Spinoza attempts to break off their correspondence by explaining 
why he does not accept Blyenbergh’s subjection of the understanding to the revealed 
word of god. And in doing so, Spinoza also explains why his own first principle is to 
completely trust in his understanding: 
 
If it is your conviction that God speaks more clearly and effectually through 
Holy Scripture than through the light of the natural understanding which he 
has also granted us and maintains strong and uncorrupted through his divine 
wisdom, you have good reason to adapt your understanding to the opinions 
which you ascribe to Holy Scripture. Indeed I myself could do no other. For 
my part, I plainly and unambiguously avow that I do not understand Holy 
Scripture, although I devoted quite a number of years to its study. And since I 
am conscious that when an indisputable proof is presented to me, I find it 
impossible to entertain thoughts that cast doubt upon it, I entirely acquiesce 
in what my intellect shows me without any suspicion that I am deceived 
therein…21 
 
With this short passage Spinoza explains why he grants the natural 
understanding supremacy over religious authority. Spinoza claims he accepts the 
authority of an “indisputable proof” over interpretations of Scripture, because when 
Spinoza understands such a proof, he finds that he cannot doubt its conclusion. And 
despite his extensive study of Scripture, Spinoza notes that he does not find the 
content of written Scripture to be expressed in such an effectual manner.  
Contrary to Jonathan Bennett’s insistence that “No philosopher was less 
inclined than Spinoza to make any theoretical use of the notion of the first person 
singular,” 22  Spinoza defends his commitment to reason by appealing to the first 
person certainty he is aware of when he understands a proof. Spinoza claims he is 
capable of doubting whether or not what is expressed in written Scripture is true. But 
Spinoza claims, in regard to understanding “he cannot cast doubt upon it.” Thus, 
Spinoza rejects Scripture as a source of certain truth, and entirely acquiesces to what 
his understanding shows him. 
Although Spinoza’s confidence in reason is often interpreted as “a 
religious…trust in the rational nature of reality,”23 Spinoza’s dispute with Blyenbergh 
puts Spinoza’s trust in reason in a far more naturalistic light: Spinoza has an absolute 
trust in what his intellect shows him because he finds it impossible to do otherwise. 
He is aware that he cannot doubt that which he clearly and distinctly understands. 
Third, Spinoza finishes his attempt to terminate his correspondence with 
Blyenbergh by contrasting the fruits of his own unqualified commitment to reason 
with the fruits of Blyenbergh’s subjection of reason to the judgment of Scripture. 
Blyenbergh, in his reply to Spinoza, painted himself as a tragic figure: He is 
“wretched” without the certainty of his own immortality, and spends his days offering 
supplications to God for “this, and only this.” Spinoza contrasts Blyenbergh’s misery 
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with the happiness Spinoza has himself attained by trusting only in his natural 
understanding:  
 
Even if I were once to find untrue the fruits which I have gathered from my 
natural understanding, they would still make me happy; for I enjoy them, and 
seek to pass my life not in sorrowing and sighing, but in peace, joy, and 
cheerfulness, and so I ascend a step higher.24 
 
The happiness Spinoza has attained through the natural understanding is no 
accident. In the Ethics, Spinoza argues that peace, joy, and cheerfulness are necessarily 
produced by the activity of the natural understanding. 25  The Ethics offers 
sophisticated metaphysical arguments to support this claim,26 but here it is sufficient 
to note that throughout his developed work, Spinoza connects the positive emotions 
(like joy, peace, and cheerfulness) with the attainment of certainty. Spinoza claims that 
insofar as we are certain our thoughts do not waver between assent and dissent, and 
we do not find ourselves torn between conflicting affects or desires: “[I]nsofar as we 
understand, we can want nothing except what is necessary, nor be absolutely satisfied 
with anything except what is true.”27  
The contrast that Spinoza draws between the success of his own method and 
the failure of Blyenbergh’s emphasizes that while Spinoza seeks the happiness 
experienced in the act of understanding, Blyenbergh only seeks confidence in his own 
cherished beliefs. It is notable that in the demonstration of Proposition 23 of Part 5 of 
the Ethics Spinoza argues that “The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with 
the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal.” Yet instead of telling 
Blyenbergh that certainty in our own immortality is attainable through the natural 
understanding, Spinoza indicates that happiness can be found simply in the joy 
brought about by the act of understanding.28 Indeed, Spinoza would still be happy if 
(per impossibile) the fruits of his understanding turned out to be false.29  
 
The Interpretive Significance of the Three Steps  
Spinoza is guarded in his letters to Blyenbergh. And Blyenbergh was not a 
correspondent who was aware of Spinoza’s developed views. So some care is needed 
before drawing broad interpretive conclusions from the letters that they exchanged. 
However, each of the three steps I have discussed in Spinoza’s attempt to terminate 
their correspondence offers significant insight into larger interpretive questions 
concerning Spinoza’s thought.  
 
The First Step  
Because Spinoza and Blyenbergh disagreed over the authority of the natural 
understanding Spinoza thought their further correspondence would be unhelpful. 
Indeed, in his letters to Blyenbergh, Spinoza treats confidence in the natural 
understanding as a prerequisite for philosophical dialogue and for properly engaging 
with his Geometric Method. Spinoza suggests the same in another correspondence, 
where he chides Henry Oldenburg for failing to accept his proof for the existence of 
God. There, Spinoza remarks, “A philosopher is supposed to know what is the 
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difference between fiction and a clear and distinct conception, and also to know the 
truth of this axiom, to wit, that every definition or clear and distinct idea, is true.”30  
 If this is Spinoza’s considered position, then it is likely that Spinoza thought 
the ideal reader of the Ethics should have an unqualified confidence in the authority of 
reason before they engaged with the work. And this position presents a challenge to the 
many accounts of Spinoza’s epistemology that focus only upon the metaphysics of the 
Ethics.31 It is clear, in these letters at least, that Spinoza treats confidence in the natural 
understanding as a first principle—and not as something to be argued to by way of 
metaphysics.  
And this makes sense.  A reader of the Ethics who questioned the authority of 
reason would hardly be convinced by Spinoza’s use of reason to justify reason’s 
authority. Yet many interpretations of Spinoza’s epistemology read the second part of 
the Ethics as engaging in just such a project.32 The temptation of such readings is 
understandable. In Part II of the Ethics Spinoza explains how it is that we possess 
ideas that necessarily correspond with their object. And this looks like a defense of the 
adequacy of reason. But Spinoza’s explanations here rely upon our taking his clearly 
and distinctly understood axioms, definitions, and inferences, as true, or at least as 
convincing. Thus, if Part II of the Ethics is to be read as a defense of trusting in the 
natural intellect, it will read as a poor circular, one. 
Although I will not press the point here, I believe Part II of the Ethics is 
properly understood as a metaphysical explanation of the fact that our clear and distinct 
ideas necessarily correspond with their object. It is not intended as providing the 
grounds for our belief in this fact.33   Whether or not one accepts this assessment, 
Spinoza’s response to Blyenbergh at least points us to a Spinozistic defense of reason 
that is not grounded in metaphysics, and which, is arguably alluded to throughout the 
Ethics.34  
The “first principle” that Spinoza identifies in his letters to Blyenbergh also 
gives reason to doubt several popular interpretations of the justificatory structure of 
the Ethics. Jonathon Bennett and Edwin Curley present the justificatory structure of 
the Ethics as being hypothetico-deductive.35 On this view, it is the over-all explanatory 
power of the propositions derived from Spinoza’s axioms that provides the 
justification for these axioms. Other commentators have proposed that Spinoza’s 
Ethics relies upon a form of coherentism.36 On this view, it is the overall consistency 
of Spinoza’s system that is supposed to justify its acceptance. But, as we’ve seen, when 
Spinoza defends his manner of philosophizing against Blyenbergh, Spinoza makes no 
mention of the vast explanatory success of his method, nor does he appeal to the 
overall consistency of his thought. In his letters to Blyenbergh, Spinoza claims it is the 
certainty experienced in our understanding that precludes us from doubting its 
testimony.  
 
The Second Step 
In the second step of Spinoza’s attempt to discontinue his correspondence 
with Blyenbergh, Spinoza explains why he grants the natural intellect complete 
authority in his philosophy. In his explanation, Spinoza makes an explicit appeal to the 
certainty he experiences when he understands a valid proof. Because Spinoza 
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experiences this certainty, he rejects Blyenbergh’s principle of trusting Scripture over 
that which is clearly and distinctly understood.  
The rejected principle of Blyenbergh’s is quite similar to a principle found in 
Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy. There, Descartes writes:  
 
Divine Authority must be put before our own perception; but, that aside, the 
philosopher should give his assent only to what he has perceived. 
...Although the light of reason may, with the utmost clarity and evidence, 
appear to suggest something different, we must still put our entire faith in 
divine authority rather than in our own judgment.37  
 
Spinoza’s rejection of Blyenbergh’s principle is thus a noteworthy rejection of 
a significant principle in Cartesian thought.38  Just how significant this principle really is 
to Descartes thinking is, of course, debatable. Descartes’ admonition to trust “divine 
authority” over the intellect might have been offered only to appease traditionalists in 
the Church.39 Be that as it may, Spinoza’s explanation of why he rejects this Cartesian 
principle shows that Spinoza rejects another feature of Descartes’ thinking, a feature 
that is indisputably significant: In his rejection of Blyenbergh’s principle, Spinoza 
rejects the voluntarism upon which the Cartesian account of epistemic normativity 
depends.  
Descartes distinguishes between the intellect and the will. According to 
Descartes, the intellect presents to us mental content, while the will judges the veracity 
this content.40   There are two strands in Descartes thought concerning the will’s 
power to judge intellectual content. In one strand, the power is absolute; in the other 
it is qualified. Descartes often asserts that we, through our will, have the absolute 
power to grant or withhold assent from ideas of even the utmost clarity and 
distinctness.41  Descartes most explicit statement of this absolute power of the will is 
found in his letter to Father Denis Mesland: 
 
For it is always open to us to hold back from pursuing a clearly known good, 
or from admitting a clearly perceived truth, provided we consider it a good 
thing to demonstrate the freedom of our will by so doing. (CSMKIII 245) 
 
Descartes and Blyenbergh’s principle that we ought to assent to the claims of 
Scripture over the clearest ideas of our intellect hangs upon this strand in Cartesian 
thought. For if “ought implies can” it would be foolish to recommend that one ought 
to hold back assent from that which is clearly and distinctly understood if only 
absolute assent is possible.  
There is however, the other strand in Descartes thought. Often, Descartes 
appears to claim that it is straightforwardly impossible to doubt a clear and distinct idea:  
 
I could not but judge that something which I understood so clearly was true; 
but this was not because I was compelled so to judge by any external force, 
but because a great light in the intellect was followed by a great inclination in 
the will...42 
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...the nature of my mind is such that I cannot but assent to these things, as 
least so long as I clearly perceive them.43  
 
Admittedly my nature is such that so long as I perceive something very clearly 
and distinctly I cannot but believe it to be true.44 
 
Now some of these perceptions are so transparently clear and at the same 
time so simple that we cannot ever think of them without believing them to 
be true...that is, we can never doubt them.45  
 
So long as we attend to a truth which we perceive very clearly, we cannot 
doubt it.46  
 
...Our mind is of such a nature that it cannot help assenting to what it clearly 
understands.47  
 
...the minds of all of us have so moulded by nature that whenever we perceive 
something clearly, we spontaneously give our assent to it and are quite unable 
to doubt its truth.48  
 
In this second strand of Descartes’ thinking, the voluntarism that Descartes 
ascribes to the will—the ability of the will to grant or withhold assent—appears to 
break down in the face of a clear and distinct idea.  
Scholars often debate whether these two strands in Descartes thought can be 
united in a coherent manner.49 In the Ethics, Spinoza denies altogether the Cartesian 
distinction between the intellect and the will,50 and so, strictly speaking, has no stake 
in this debate. But it is clear that Spinoza embraces the central tenant of the second 
strand of Descartes thinking: Spinoza holds that clear and distinct ideas are 
indubitable. 
In Blyenbergh and Spinoza’s dispute over first principles then, both appeal to 
apparently contradictory aspects of Cartesian epistemology. Blyenbergh, in keeping 
with Descartes voluntarism, believes that if a conflict were ever to come up between 
our understanding and Scripture, one can, and ought to, choose to accept written 
Scripture over what one understands. Spinoza, in keeping with the Cartesian claims of 
indubitability, responds, that it is in fact, impossible to make such a choice: One 
cannot withhold assent from that which is clearly and distinctly understood. While 
much more should be said about how the notions of assent and dissent become 
transformed when moving between Descartes and Spinoza’s thought, it is worth 
focusing here upon Spinoza’s rejection of voluntarism in regard to our clear and 
distinct ideas, and how it reveals Spinoza’s rejection of the Cartesian picture of 
epistemic normativity.  
Descartes explicitly links voluntarism with epistemic normativity:  
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We do not praise automatons for accurately producing all the movements 
they were designed to perform, because the production of these movements 
occurs necessarily.... By the same principle, when we embrace the truth, our 
doing so voluntarily is much more to our credit than would be the case if we 
could not do otherwise.51  
 
Whether or not Cartesian freedom always entails the ability to do otherwise—a 
point often disputed in the literature52—Descartes plainly holds that there is nothing 
epistemically praiseworthy about believing what one must. 53  
Descartes concern with praiseworthiness is pervasive throughout the general 
Cartesian epistemological project. Descartes is concerned with demonstrating to a will 
that is free to choose whether or not to grant assent to its clear and distinct ideas that 
it should have confidence in these ideas, that it ought to accept that which is clearly and 
distinctly understood, and that it is praiseworthy when it wholly accepts that which the 
intellect clearly and distinctly conveys54—at least in regard to non-theological matters.  
Spinoza, however, denies that we have the ability to withhold our assent to a 
clear and distinct idea. And with this denial, Spinoza abandons the Cartesian interest 
in the praiseworthiness of this assent. Spinoza places the first principle of his 
epistemology outside of what a Cartesian would recognize as a normative context. In 
his response to Bylenbergh, Spinoza does not assert that his principle of absolute 
acquiescence in the face of a clear and distinct idea is justified or praiseworthy. 
Instead, Spinoza defends absolute acquiescence as a direct consequence of 
apprehending a clear and distinct idea. 
By Cartesian standards, the foundation of Spinoza’s epistemology is decidedly 
non-normative. Descartes claims that without the freedom to grant or withhold assent 
our epistemic behavior would be that of an “automaton”— unworthy of praise or 
blame. But Spinoza uses the term “automaton” to describe what he takes to be unique 
feature of his own epistemology. Spinoza claims in his Treatise of the Emendation of the 
Intellect that he, unlike any among the ancients, treats the soul [the intellect/will] “as 
acting according to certain laws, like a spiritual automaton.”55  
As I argue below, there is conceptual room for normativity within Spinoza’s 
epistemology. But Spinoza’s defense of his first principle against Blyenbergh makes 
clear that the key starting point of Spinoza’s epistemology is not the claim that we 
ought to affirm our clear and distinct ideas. The key point is that we necessarily do 
so.56  
 
The Third Step 
The final step of Spinoza’s attempt to break off the correspondence with 
Blyenbergh involved a comparison between the fruits of Spinoza’s and Blyenbergh’s 
first principles: Spinoza passes his life in “peace, joy, and cheerfulness” whereas 
Blyenbergh spends his time “sighing” in misery.  
Spinoza’s comparison includes two counterfactuals. The first counterfactual is 
as follows: 
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...if it is your conviction that God speaks more clearly and effectually through 
Holy Scripture than through the light of the natural understanding ... you 
have good reason to adapt your understanding to the opinions which you 
ascribe to Holy Scripture. Indeed I myself could do no other.57 
 
There are two interesting points here. First, there is the counter-factual itself. 
Spinoza claims that if Scripture spoke more clearly and effectually than the natural 
understanding, Spinoza would accept the authority of Scripture. Indeed, he “could do 
no other.” This counterfactual emphasizes once again that Spinoza’s fundamental 
commitment to the intellect rests upon the effectiveness of the intellect in forming 
ideas that are beyond doubt. As Spinoza here notes, if this kind of effectiveness were 
to be found in the words of Scripture (or for that matter, anywhere else) Spinoza 
would restructure his entire system of thought. Second, there is the introduction of a 
normative expression. Spinoza claims that Blyenbergh would have “good reason” to 
adjust his understanding to the testimony of Holy Scripture if it was his “conviction 
that God speaks more clearly and effectually through Holy Scripture.” It is only in 
Spinoza’s second counterfactual that we begin to see what Spinoza means by “good 
reason.”  
Spinoza’s second counterfactual: 
 
[E]ven if I were once to find untrue the fruits which I have gathered from my 
natural understanding, they would still make me happy; for I enjoy them, and 
seek to pass my life not in sorrowing and sighing, but in peace, joy, and 
cheerfulness.58 
 
The claim here is astounding. In his first counterfactual, Spinoza had just 
indicated to Blyenbergh that he would have to restructure his entire thought if 
Scripture spoke more effectively than the natural understanding. But in this 
counterfactual, Spinoza claims that he would not restructure his thought if the natural 
understanding turned out on occasion to be wrong. While it would be hasty to view 
Spinoza here, as devaluing truth, the importance that Spinoza places here on certainty 
cannot be overstated: It is not truth, but certainty, and the benefits that go along with 
its possession—peace, joy and cheerfulness—that provide the “good reason” for 
accepting our strongest and most effectual ideas.  
Spinoza’s two counterfactuals suggest a surprising position that once again 
can be found back in Descartes. Spinoza appears to grant the possibility that his 
epistemic principle can lead to error, while simultaneously emphasizing that the value 
of his principle lies in its promise of certainty. This may seem like a strange and 
contradictory position, but it is similar to a position that Descartes takes in his reply to 
the objections of Mersenne.  
In his objections to Descartes Meditations, Mersenne challenges Descartes 
certainty that he had removed any doubt that our intellect could be deceived. 
Mersenne asks, “Why should it not be in your nature to be subject to constant –or at 
least very frequent—deception? How can you establish with certainty that you are not 
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deceived, or capable of being deceived, in matters which you think you know clearly 
and distinctly?”59 Descartes’ response is as follows:  
 
Now if this conviction is so firm that it is impossible for us ever to have any 
reason for doubting what we are convinced of, then there are no further 
questions for us to ask: We have everything that we could reasonably want. 
What is it to us that someone may make out that the perception whose truth 
we are so firmly convinced of may appear false to God or an angel, so that it 
is, absolutely speaking, false? Why should this alleged ‘absolute falsity’ bother 
us, since we neither believe in it nor have even the smallest suspicion of it? 
For the supposition which we are making here is of a conviction so firm that 
it is quite incapable of being destroyed; and such a conviction is clearly the 
same as the most perfect certainty.”60  
 
Here Descartes argues that even if his methodology does not succeed as an 
absolute guarantor of truth, it still succeeds as an absolute guarantor of certainty. 
Moreover, he claims that its success as a guarantor of certainty is more important than 
its success or lack of success as a guarantee of absolute truth.  
In this reply to Mersenne, Descartes places heavy importance upon our own 
ability to evaluate our thoughts. And this is consistent with Descartes general 
approach to epistemology. The Cartesian method of doubt is an internalist method of 
self-evaluation.61 On Descartes’ method we are to reject any idea or belief that we are 
capable of doubting: 
 
Anything which admits of the slightest doubt I will set aside just as if I had 
found it to be wholly false; and I will proceed in this way until I recognize 
something certain...62  
 
The result of the Cartesian method of doubt is either that we have indubitable 
thoughts—thoughts that remain indubitable even after our consideration of 
Mersenne’s skeptical possibility—as, for example, the cogito is thought by Descartes to 
be, or we do not. If we have indubitable ideas we have everything we could 
epistemically want—we have indubitable ideas that can never be shaken. Mersenne 
could challenge Descartes by insisting that we do not have indubitable ideas, but 
Mersenne’s skeptical possibility rest upon the supposition that we have clear and 
distinct ideas—ideas that for us are absolutely certain—yet do not meet some 
externalist standard of correspondence. Descartes point is that Mersenne’s externalist 
standard is irrelevant to his interests. To the extent that Descartes “wanted to 
establish anything at all in the sciences that was stable and likely to last,”63 a worry like 
Mersenne’s is no worry at all.  
So how then can we make sense of the epistemic approach Spinoza describes 
in his letters Blyenbergh? Unlike Descartes, Spinoza primary concern is not stability 
within the sciences. Spinoza’s primary goal is to “to pass ... life ... in peace, joy, and 
cheerfulness.” But, as Spinoza argues in his letters to Blyenbergh and throughout the 
Ethics, “peace, joy and cheerfulness” are best attained through the formation of 
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indubitable ideas, that is, through the act of understanding.64  Thus, Spinoza can offer 
“good reasons” to structure his beliefs around his indubitable ideas, even if, contrary 
to our certitude—and the indubitable metaphysics revealed by our certain ideas—
these ideas could somehow turn out to be false.  
 
Conclusion 
I have framed Spinoza’s and Blyenbergh’s dispute over epistemic first 
principles as a dispute over conflicting aspects of Cartesian epistemology. I have 
argued that the foundation of Spinoza’s epistemology is the first-person experience of 
certainty. But, although I have proposed that Spinoza embraces this decidedly 
Cartesian foundation, I have also argued that unlike Descartes, Spinoza understands 
this foundation as non-normative: For Spinoza, it is not the case that it is praiseworthy 
to assent to our clear and distinct ideas, but it is the case, that given our desire for 
peace, joy and cheerfulness, we ought to try to discover such ideas. None of this of 
course, touches upon Spinoza radically non-Cartesian explanation of why it is 
metaphysically that our certain ideas are necessarily true. But as the Spinoza-Blyenbergh 
correspondence reveals, Spinoza’s appropriation of select parts of Cartesian 
epistemology yields a unique, naturalistic, internalist approach to epistemology that 
avoids many of the paradoxes associated with the Cartesian project. 
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